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IN T~E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES CORP., * 
a Utah corporation, 
* Plaintiff and 
Respondent, * 
v. 
* 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, a * 
Utah corporation, and JOHN 
and JANE DOES One through * 
Eight, 
* Defendants and 
Appellants. * 
Case No. 16341 
* * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
IN OPPOSITION TO APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
* * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by plaintiff-respondent, 
MANAGEMENT SERVICES CORPORATION (hereinafter Management 
Services), purchaser, against DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, seller, 
for the breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated December 
7, 1976 (hereinafter the Contract), wherein Development 
Associates agreed to sell to Management Services eight (8) 
improved lots in the Daybreak Phase III Subdivision for a total 
price of $80,000, calculated at $10,000 per lot. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND SUPREME COURT 
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
sitting without a jury, held that the Contract was divisible; 
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that Management Services defaulted with respect to an 
installment payment of $19,800 due on March 1, 1977, and 
thereby forfeited its interest in two of the eight lots 
specified in the Contract; and that Development Associates 
wrongfully terminated the Contract with respect to the 
remaining six lots for payments which were not due until April 
1, May 1, and June 1, 1977. Accordingly, on February 1, 1979, 
the trial court entered judgment in favor of Management 
Services on its third cause of action for damages for the 
breach of contract by Development Associates and awarded 
Management Services $7,700 in lost profits; $2,438 in lost 
commissions; $600 for the wrongful retention of earnest money; 
costs of $159.05; and attorneys' fees of $1,850, for a total 
judgment of $12,747.05 with interest at the rate of eight 
percent. This Court, in its decision filed September 11, 1980, 
affirmed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case 
to the district court for its determination of reasonable 
attorneys' fees to be granted to Management Services for 
successfully prevailing on the appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Management Services respectfully requests that this Court 
deny the petition for rehearing of this matter sought by 
Development Associates, and thereby affirm the earlier decision 
of this Court upholding the judgment of the trial court and 
remanding this case to the trial court for its determination of 
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reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Management Services in 
prevailing on the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Management Services does not controvert the assertions 
contained in the Statement of Material Facts submitted by 
Development Associates. However, Management Services submits 
that a complete understanding of the factual situation may not 
be had without consideration of what follows. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract executed on December 7, 
1976 by Development Associates and Management Services was 
prepared by Development Associates (Record at 134, 288-89). 
Language in that Contract bearing on the issue of severability 
includes not only Paragraphs 2 and 3 quoted by Development 
Associates, but also the following (R. 9): 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an 
obligation against said property in favor of State 
Savings & Loan and Land Funding, Inc. with an unpaid 
balance of $8,600.00 per lot, as of December 1, 1976. 
While Mr. Edward A. White, representing Management Services 
in the negotiations of the Contract, was familiar with real 
estate transactions generally and with the specific contract 
form used on this occasion, Development Associates was likewise 
represented by a man of considerable experience in these real 
estate matters and forms, Mr. Marvin J. Kirkham (R. 229). Mr. 
Kirkham graduated from college with a degree in business 
management, attended one year of law school, worked for several 
years as a real estate agent, and later as a broker, and had 
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been involved in between three and four hundred transactions 
involving Uniform Real Estate Contracts similar to the one here 
at issue (R. 239-43). 
The reason Management Services did not make the payment of 
$19,800 due on March 1, 1977, was that it sought, as a 
precondition to the payment, security from Development 
Associates that certain improvements on the lots contracted f~ 
would be made (R. 13). While the time such improvements were 
to be made has been disputed by the parties (R. 136, 231, 
254-57), both parties clearly understood, as Mr. Kirkham of 
Development Associates admitted at trial, that these 
improvements were to be made on the lots at the expense of 
Development Associates (R. 132-36, 228-32). Moreover, 
Management Services did offer to pay the overdue monies into 
escrow (R. 13, 251). 
Furthermore, both parties clearly understood that the lots 
which Management Services had contracted to buy were to be 
resold by Management Services to other parties (R. 127, 136-37, 
256). 
The consideration for the eight lots named in the Contract 
was calculated on the basis of $10,000 per lot (R. 129). The 
figure of $800 paid as a deposit on the Contract was likewise 
arrived at by calculating $100 per lot as Mr. Kirkham testified 
at trial in response to a question of his own attorney (R. 
265). Separate warranty deeds were to be issued by Developmen: 
Associates for each lot as it was paid for (R. 266). 
-4-
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re 
The eight lots named in the Contract were each encumbered 
by a mortgage debt of $6,600 in favor of State Savings & Loan 
and by an obligation of approximately $2,000 in favor of Land 
Funding, Inc., the party from which Development Associates was 
purchasing the property (R. 66-68). As Management Services 
paid for each lot, Development Associates intended to transfer 
money to State Savings & Loan and to Land Funding, Inc., to 
satisfy the obligations owed those parties, and thereby to 
procure a release from those parties of each lot on a 
lot-by-lot basis. (R. 268.) 
After Development Associates retook possession of the eight 
lots from Management Services, it began reselling them for its 
own account. The six lots later found by the trial court to 
have been wrongfully forfeited by Development Associates were 
resold to six different parties (R. 236-37). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NO REASON JUSTIFYING A REHEARING BAS BEEN ALLEGED. 
Many years ago, this Court settled the standards governing 
the granting of a rehearing in Venard v. Old Hickory M. & S. 
Company, 4 Utah 67, 7 P. 408, 409 (1885), as follows: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be made. 
We must be convinced, either that the court failed to 
duly consider some material point in the case, or that 
it erred in its conclusions, or that some matter has 
been discovered which was unknown at the time. 
-5-
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The present petition for rehearing makes no allegation of 
the discovery of new material. Nor does the petition allege 
that this Court failed to consider some material point in the 
case. That leaves, as the only available ground for granting 
the rehearing, and the only one urged by Development 
Associates, that this Court erred in its conclusions. Where 
only this ground is urged for granting the rehearing, this 
Court has traditionally and justifiably been loath to comply. 
People v. Rogerson, 4 Utah 231, 7 P. 411 (1885); In re 
MacKnight, 4 Utah 237, 9 P. 299 (1886); Brown v. Pickard, 4 
Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886); Bacon v. Raybould, 4 Utah 357, 11 
P. 510 (1886). More recently, this Court took pains to 
elaborate on the rational for this approach. After noting that 
an application for a rehearing is a matter of right not to be 
discouraged in proper cases, it was said in Cummings v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, at 624 (1913) that: 
When this court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a case, a 
rehearing should not be applied for unless we have 
misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or 
facts, or have overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law or have either 
misapplied or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result. In this case, nothing was done or 
attempted by counsel, except to reargue the very 
propositions we have fully considered and decided. If 
we should write opinions on all the petitions for 
rehearings filed, we should have to devote a very 
large portion of our time in answering counsel's 
contentions a second time; and if we should grant 
rehearings because they are demanded, we should do 
nothing else save to write and rewrite opinions in a 
few cases. Let it again be said that it is conceded, 
as a matter of course, that we cannot convince losing 
counsel that their contention should not prevail, but 
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in making this concession let it also be remembered 
that we, and not counsel, must ultimately assume all 
responsibility with respect to whether our conclusions 
are sound or unsound. . .. As a general rule, 
therefore, merely to reargue the grounds originally 
presented can be of little, if any, aid to us. 
Finding no merit in the petition presented in Cummings, the 
petition was denied. The same considerations govern the 
instant petition for rehearing and it also should be denied. 
II. 
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN UPHOLDING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT 
THE CONTRACT WAS AMBIGUOUS ON 
THE ISSUE OF SEVERABILITY. 
The brief in support of the petition for rehearing 
challenges the finding that the Contract was ambiguous on the 
issue of severability and therefore urges that it was error for 
the trial court to admit parole evidence thereon. The only 
support for this assertion of error is a pair of quotations 
from the dissenting opinion which undoubtedly were considered 
by this Court in arriving at its prior decision upholding the 
finding of the trial court that the Contract was ambiguous on 
the severability issue. Nothing new is offered by Development 
Associates for its position. 
With all due respect, the approach of the dissenting 
opinion, which approach is adopted by Development Associates, 
errs in that it focuses almost exclusively on the printed 
provisions of the form contract which might be read to support 
the argument against severability while ignoring the 
-7-
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typewritten language in the Contract which points in favor of 
severability. See Record at 9-10. This approach is faulty in 
two respects. In exalting printed over typewritten language, 
it contravenes the holding of this Court that where a printed 
form of contract is used, language supplied by the parties in 
writing or otherwise is to take precedence over the printed 
matter. Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 540 (Utah 
1977). Language supplied by the parties included the telling 
piece stating (R. 9) : 
Beginning March 1, 1977, buyer to complete payment on 
two (2) lots ($19,800.00) and thereafter to close two 
(2) lots on the first of each month. Total amount to 
be paid on or before June 15, 1977. 
Secondly, the dissent's approach trespasses against the 
principle that an ambiguous document is to be "strictly 
construed against him who draws it." Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 
440, 354 P.2d 121, 123 (1960). The fact that a form contract 
was used in the instant case does not militate otherwise where, 
as here, the use of that form was suggested by Development 
Associates which also prepared the contract by filling in the 
blanks. 
The dissenting opinion's construction of the printed 
provisions of the Contract as requiring all lots to be taken or 
none at all is not as inexorable as the dissenters appear to 
view it. First, the dissent assumes that it is contrary to any 
theory of severability for the buyer to take possession of all 
eight lots specified in the Contract on the date of the 
Contract's execution. Management Services submits that when 
read in the abstract, such a provision is quite neutral on the 
-8-
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issue of severability. When, however, it is realized that the 
provision was apparently intended to allow Management Services 
to bring prospective buyers on the lots to secure committments 
for resale of those lots, the provision may be seen as tipping 
the balance, if any direction, in favor of severability. 
The dissent next argues that inasmuch as eight lots were 
specified in the Contract of Sale, "it was not intended that 
the buyer be permitted to accept certain lots and reject 
others." Dissenting Opinion at 9. This is a "straw man" 
argument with no force. A contract is virtually never entered 
into by any party, and certainly not here, with the intention 
that it will be breached. Indeed, the response of Management 
Services to the notice of contract forfeiture served on it by 
Development Associates indicated that Management Services fully 
intended to pay for and take title to each of the lots named in 
the Contract. See Record at 13. Management Services did not 
foresee that its delayed action with respect to the March 
payment while it sought security for the completion of the 
improvements to the lots would be deemed a breach of the 
Contract and a forfeiture of the right to two or any other 
number of the eight lots. However, as noted more fully in part 
III of this brief, the intention to purchase each of the lots 
offered for sale does not answer the only relevant question, 
which is whether Development Associates would have been willing 
to sell, and whether Management Services would have been 
willing to buy, less than eight lots. It is submitted that 
both parties would have agreed to such a sale. Moreover, the 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issue of severability typically arises only after, for whatever 
reason, it is no longer possible for the whole original 
Contract to be entirely satisfied. What was ~ontracted for is 
not dispositive of what smaller quantity might instead have 
been agreed upon. 
The dissent's reliance on the printed remedial provisions 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract is also misplaced. 
Paragraph 16(c) which allows the seller the right to sue for 
the entire unpaid balance of the contract when the buyer fails 
to make a payment within a specified period after the due date, 
provides a harsh remedy to the seller to compensate him for the 
risk he bears in selling his property on time and for 
installments instead of for a lump sum cash payment up front. 
As such, it was almost surely drafted with a single parcel in 
mind to be paid for in several installments. To infer from 
this printed provision that the Contract is not severable, 
where the form was used instead for the sale of eight distinct 
lots to be closed separately upon the payment of a single sum 
for each lot, is clearly inappropriate. For the same reasons, 
recourse to the repossession option provided in Paragraph 16(a) 
is also neutral on the issue of severability under the 
circumstances. 
Finally, the willingness of Development Associates to allow 
Management Services to choose the two lots to which it takes 
title in any given month, which procedure is the best suited 
method of securing the resale of these lots, is entirely 
consonant with the majority's holding that the lots were 
-10-
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considered "fungible" and undercuts the argument of the 
dissenting opinion that this contractual arrangement requires 
as a matter of law that the contract be interpreted as entire. 
Accordingly, as the Contract was ambiguous on its face as 
to whether the parties intended that the sale of each lot, or 
each pair of lots, was severable, this Court properly upheld 
the action of the district court in considering extraneous 
evidence of the parties' intentions in this matter. 
III. 
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT HAD A RATIONAL BASIS 
FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE CONTRACT WAS 
INTENDED TO BE SEVERABLE AND NOT ENTIRE. 
Development Associates asserts that there was no rational 
basis for the district court's conclusion that the Contract was 
severable (1) because allegedly no evidence was introduced on 
the issue of severability at the trial of this action, and (2) 
because "Management Services intended to and did in fact enter 
into a contract to purchase eight lots in the Daybreak Phase 
III Subdivision." Brief of Development Associates in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing at 7. Management Services submits 
that evidence bearing on the issue of severability was 
introduced at the trial of this matter. To quote the majority 
opinion at page 3: 
The testimony at trial showed that plaintiff is a 
corporation organized for the purpose of buying and 
-11-
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selling property, and that its president, Edward A. 
White, is a real estate broker. Plaintiff was 
purchasing the lots for resale . . 
See Record at 125, 127, 136-37, 256. These facts bear on the 
severability issue because they indicate Development Associates 
entered into this transaction with Management Services merely 
as a way of quickly and efficiently marketing these individual 
lots. At the time the Contract was made, it was not known 
which lots would sell first or which would bring the highest 
eventual price. Obviously, Development Associates was simply 
interested in unloading as many of these properties as would ~ 
taken by the first buyer to offer a fair price. Management 
Services, as to the eight lots contracted for, was this buyer. 
Had Management Services only been willing to buy six lots 
initially, Development Associates would have had no objection 
to such a sale, for it later sold the six lots still in issue 
to six different buyers. From these facts, it is evident that 
Development Associates had no apparent reason to demand that 
the eight lots be sold as a single unit or not at all. As this 
criterion is the determining factor of whether the Contract was 
severable under the test of divisibility properly established 
by the majority opinion of this court, the district court's 
opinion, and that of this Court affirming it, should stand. 
Corning to the second point of Development Associates, no 
answer to the severability question is provided by asserting 
that Management Services intended to purchase all eight lots 
offered by Development Associates and specified in the 
-12-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Contract. As Management Services was confident it could resell 
each of the eight lots offered at a profit, it naturally agreed 
to purchase that many. But there was nothing magic in the 
number or location of these eight lots. Indeed, Development 
Associates has articulated no reason why it might have desired 
to sell all eight lots only as a single group. It has instead 
only offered strained arguments based on the bare language of 
the Contract and later documents. 
What the test of severability requires, as has been shown, 
is a determination of "whether the purpose of the parties was 
to buy and sell the whole tract as a unit so that the parties 
would not have agreed on less than the whole, in which case the 
contract is entire; otherwise, it is severable." Majority 
Opinion at 2. Just because the parties intended to and did 
enter into a contract for the sale of eight lots does not mean 
that the parties would have refused to make a contract for any 
smaller number of lots. As the interest of Development 
Associates was only that of recovering its investment in these 
properties with a fair profit at the soonest point possible, it 
is quite clear it would have been willing to sell any number of 
lots Management Services was willing to buy. This conclusion 
is substantiated by the fact that Development Associates later 
sold the six lots as to which Management Services had not 
forfeited its interest to six different parties. 
Thus it appears that the record and the inferences fairly 
drawn therefrom more than adequately support the trial court's 
decision that the parties intended the Contract to be severable. 
-13-
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, the majority of this Court 
properly affirmed the holding of the district court in this 
matter that the Contract was severable and that Development 
Associates wrongfully terminated the Contract as to the six 
lots for which payment was not due until April, May, and June 
of 1977. The award of damages to Management Services which 
suffered by this breach was proper. As no legitimate ground 
for reconsidering the prior decision of this Court in this 
matter has been presented, the petition for rehearing should ~ 
denied and this action should be remanded to the district court· 
for a determination of the attorneys' fees to be awarded to 
Management Services for the effort expended in prevailing on 
the prior appeal and with respect to this petition for 
rehearing, pursuant to the earlier decision of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
By,~~~·· 
Kent B. Scott 
0 ,(,,, c ·t\,(e:: ... ~L/1.~-By: <-'t~v'- I \; • 
John.,K. Mangum 
Attorneys for Management Services, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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